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AUTHORSHIP AND TERMINATION
RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS
MARY LAFRANCE*

INTRODUCTION
In late 1999, Congress amended the definition of "works made for
hire" in § 101 of the Copyright Act' to make explicit its intent to include
sound recordings as a category of works eligible for this status. The
amendment was repealed with retroactive effect less than a year later. All
this happened-pardon the expression--in record time.
This odd course of events was precipitated by a request from the
record industry, represented by the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA"), which persuaded Congress, shortly before passage of
the Intellectual Property and Omnibus Communications Reform Act of
1999, to add a "technical amendment" purporting to clarify Congress'
intent to make sound recordings eligible for work-made-for-hire status,
thus conferring full authorship of those recordings on record companies
rather than recording artists.2 With neither analysis nor debate, the
amendment was accepted by both houses of Congress and signed into law
by President Clinton. When outraged musicians and scholars discovered
that, virtually overnight, the substantive law of copyright had undergone
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The
author would like to thank the faculty of the Boyd School of Law for their helpful comments at a
workshop presentation of this paper.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
2. Section 1110(d) of the 1999 Act reads: "Work Made for Hire-Section 101 of title 17,
United States Code, is amended in the definition relating to work for hire in paragraph (2) by inserting
,as a sound recording,' after 'audiovisual work'." Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I-S. 1948, §1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501A-521,
1501A-544 (1999) (amending 17 U.S.C. §101) (repealed 2000). According to press reports, this
amendment, which clearly served the interests of record companies, was drafted and shepherded
through Congress by a particular legislative aide, who, shortly after its adoption, accepted a position as
a lobbyist for the RIAA. See Peter J. Strand, What a Short, Strange Trip It's Been: Sound Recordings
and the Work Madefor Hire Doctrine,ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2000, at 12.
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this dramatic change, the reaction was swift, loud, and overwhelmingly
disapproving.3 Reeling from the bad press, Congress held a brief hearing
and retroactively repealed the amendment, returning the authorship of
4
sound recordings to the status quo ante-apparently.
Now that the amendment has been repealed, two questions remain:
First, under current law, who is the author of a sound recording? Second,
regardless of the answer to the first question under current law, who should
be the author of a sound recording?
This Article explores both issues. The attempt to resolve these
specific problems, however, reveals a deeper underlying problem in
copyright law. Technological change has blurred the distinctions between
two categories of copyrightable works-sound recordings and audiovisual
works-that were once easily distinguishable from one another. As a
result, the current statutory scheme, which allocates different rights to these
formerly distinct categories, has lost some of its coherence.
I. LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE STATUS
Work-made-for-hire status matters in copyright law because it
determines which person or persons may exercise the exclusive rights of
authorship.
Copyright ownership vests initially in the author of the work.5 The
author may then assign or license all, or a portion, of the copyright to other
parties. With respect to most copyrightable works, however, the author (or,
after the author's death, his or her statutory successors) retains an
inalienable right to terminate such grants after a statutorily determined term
of years. 6 Once a grant has been terminated, the grantee may continue to
exploit derivative works that had already been created pursuant to the
3.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary H.R., 107th Cong. 6-7 (2001) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights);
Online Entm 't & Copyright Law: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Don Henley); Paul Sweeting, Off the Record,
VIDEO Bus., April 6, 2001, at 12.
4. Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379, 114 Stat.
1444. For a detailed account of the events leading to the 1999 amendment and its 2000 repeal, see
Strand, supra note 2; Corey Field, Their Master's Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie
Bonds: The Debate over Sound Recordings As Works Made fbr Hire, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA
145, 179 (2000); Ryan Ashley Rafoth, Note, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment:
Courts Should Not Consider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists' Termination
Rights Begin Vesting in Year 2013, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1022-25 (2000).
5.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2000).

6.

Id. §§ 203, 304(c).
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terms of the original grant, but all other rights revert to the grantor.' Except
in the case of works made for hire, authorship of a work resides in the
individual person or persons who contributed original creative expression
to the work. Thus, upon termination of a grant, the rights encompassed by
the grant revert to these creators or their statutory successors.
In contrast, the authorship of a work made for hire never resides in its
individual creators. Instead, the author is deemed to be the party that
employed or commissioned those creators to produce the work. 9 Because
the employing or commissioning party is the author, rather than a mere
grantee, that party's rights are not subject to termination.
Thus, if a sound recording is treated as a work made for hire, the
individual creative participants have no claim to authorship. They own no
interest in the copyrighted work other than the interests that are granted to
them in their contract with the record label-typically limited to a right to
receive royalties from the recording's exploitation. If a sound recording is
not a work made for hire, however, the copyright in the recording vests
initially in its individual authors-a group that would include at least the
featured musicians, and perhaps other creative participants as well.' ° A
performer's recording contract will, typically, assign copyright ownership
of the recording to the record label. This grant will be subject to
termination, however, allowing the author/performer to reclaim the balance
of the copyright term at a later date, subject to the derivative works
exception. "'
Another important consequence of the work-made-for-hire
determination is its effect on copyright duration. Under current law, a
work made for hire enters the public domain 120 years from creation or
ninety-five years from publication, whichever comes first. 12 All other
copyrights (with the exception of anonymous or pseudonymous works)
endure for seventy years after the death of the last surviving author of the
work. 13
7. Id. §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6). See, e.g., Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995)
(addressing question of which exploitations of a musical composition constituted "derivative works" for
purposes of § 304(c) derivative works exception).
8. "As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person
who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection." Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
10. See infra Part H.A (addressing the problem of identifying the authors of sound recordings).
11.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
12.
17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
13. Id. § 302(a)-(c).
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Because termination rights cannot be waived, licensed, or assigned by
an author, 4 the absence of termination rights is the most significant legal
consequence of the work-made-for-hire classification.' 5
II. WHAT QUALIFIES, WHAT DOESN'T, AND WHY
The current rules, which determine whether a copyrighted work is
"made for hire," are set forth in § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the
"1976 Act"). 16 That section provides two alternative tests. Under the first
test, a work is "made for hire" if it is created by an employee acting within
the scope of his or her employment. 17 Under the second test, work-madefor-hire status may attach to works that are "specially ordered or
commissioned" under a written work-made-for-hire agreement, but only if
18
the works fall into certain specified categories of copyrightable works.
Some of the creative participants in a sound recording may qualify as
"employees" of the record label, under the test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid ("CCNV"). 19 If (as
is ordinarily the case) the creative contributions of these participants fall
within the scope of their employment, the record label is the author of their
contributions for copyright purposes.

14. See id. §§ 201(d), 203(a), 304(c).
15. Other legal consequences include, with respect to works of visual art, the inapplicability of
the § 106A moral rights provisions, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 101 (defining "work of visual art"), and for
works published before 1978, different rules regarding the vesting of the copyright renewal term, id.
§ 304(C)(1).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The current version of Title 17 of the United States Code was enacted by
the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1332 (2000)) ("1976 Act"). The 1976 Act took effect on January 1, 1978. Pub. L. 94-553,
§ 102, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976). Thus, with respect to all sound recordings created after 1977, the identity
of the author(s) is determined under the 1976 Act. However, because sound recordings have been
copyrightable works since February 15, 1972, see Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 ("1971 Act"), the authorship of any copyrightable sound recordings created before January 1,
1978, must be determined under the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075 ("1909
Act"), as amended by the 1971 Act. Although the 1976 Act completely replaced the provisions of the
amended 1909 Act, it retained the substance of the 1971 Act. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d
1269, 1271 n.2 (I
lth Cir. 1999).
17.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
18. Id. See infra text accompanying note 20 (listing categories of copyrightable works). For
convenience, works falling into these categories are referred to in this Article as "contractual works
made for hire," reflecting the § 101 rule that they can be works made for hire only when created
pursuant to a written contract that identifies them as works made for hire.
19. "In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished." Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (listing factors
indicative of this right to control).
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Many, if not most, of the creative participants in a sound recording,
however, are not record label employees. The most obvious examples are
the featured vocalists and musicians, who are usually independent
contractors who have signed exclusive recording contracts with a record
label. Even nonfeatured musicians and vocalists, however, often will be
independent contractors rather than employees under the CCNV standard.
Similarly, a producer or a sound engineer who is not a record-label
employee also may make a substantial creative contribution to a sound
recording, and thus may have a legitimate authorial claim. In order for the
creative contributions of such independent contractors to constitute works
made for hire, thus divesting their creators of any authorship status, those
contributions must be found to fit within the "specially ordered or
commissioned" prong of the statutory definition.
As the music industry and Congress are now well aware, this is where
the problem lies. Only certain types of works can be treated as works made
for hire under the "specially commissioned" test. Prior to the 1999
amendment (and again after its retroactive repeal) the list of qualifying
works was limited to the following categories, which were first enumerated
in the 1976 Act and, until 1999, had never been altered:
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
20
atlas ....
The short-lived 1999 amendment would have inserted the phrase "as a
sound recording" after "audiovisual work" 2 1 in order to ensure that the
creative efforts of independent contractors participating in a sound
recording would be eligible for work-made-for-hire status.
In its retroactive repeal of this controversial amendment, however, the
106th Congress did not simply delete the phrase it had previously inserted.
Instead, responding to the RIAA's concern that a simple repeal would
suggest that Congress did not intend sound recordings to be works made
for hire, 22 Congress added additional new language to the "work made for

20. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. In a truly "technical" glitch, the drafters placed a comma at the end of the inserted phrase,
rather than at the beginning, thus causing the amended phrase to read "as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work as a sound recording," which made no sense at all. See I Nimmer on Copyright
(MB) § 5.03[B][2][a][iil n.121.7 (Aug. 2001).
22. Congress Repeals 1999 Copyright Act Amendment Making Sound Recordings Eligible to Be
Classified As "Works Made for Hire," 22 ENT. L. REP. 8 (2000).
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hire" definition. The new amendment adds the following passage to the
end of that definition:
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work
made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in
section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public
Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment(a) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or
(b) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval
of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted
as if both section 2(a)(l) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright
Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011 (d) of the Intellectual Property
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section
1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without
regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any
23
judicial determinations.

This legislative clutter gives new meaning to the phrase "abundance of
caution." 24 More importantly, it leaves crucial legal questions unanswered.
By returning the law to the status quo, and expressly refusing to resolve the
dispute over the status of sound recordings, Congress has returned the issue
23. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work made for hire" definition), as amended by Work Made For Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, § 2(a) Pub. L. No. 106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (2000).
24. Reaching for a belt to match its suspenders, the House Report notes:
Sec. 2. Work Made for Hire. Paragraph (a)(1) undoes the amendment to the "work made
for hire" definition in section 101 of title 17 made by section 1101(d) of IPCORA which was
enacted on November 29, 1999, by deleting the words "as a sound recording" that were added
by that amendment.
Paragraph (a)(2) adds language to the definition of "work made for hire" to make clear
that paragraph (2) of the definition is to be interpreted as if neither section 1011(d) of
IPCORA nor this bill had ever been considered or enacted by Congress. This provision is
intended to ensure that the facts and substance of consideration and enactment of section
1101(d) of this bill are not used to support any particular interpretation of paragraph (2) of the
definition of "work made for hire." The committee wishes to make clear that neither section
1101(d) nor this bill are to be construed as expressing or implying any view as to the proper
interpretation of paragraph (2) of the "work made for hire" definition before November 29,
1999 or after enactment of this bill. The language makes clear that, notwithstanding any
principles of statutory construction or cases (such as American Automobile Association v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961)), that might suggest otherwise, when interpreting
paragraph (2) of the "work made for hire" definition, courts and the Copyright Office are not
to consider or otherwise attribute any meaning to section 1101(d) or this bill's deletion from
the Copyright Act of the language added by section I101(d). Moreover, courts and the
Copyright Office are not to consider the enactment of either section 1101(d) or of this bill as
an indication of congressional awareness, approval, disapproval, acquiescence or nonacquiescence in any past judicial determinations concerning this issue.
Paragraph (b)(1) restores the status quo prior to November 29, 1999, by expressly making
the bill retroactive to November 29, 1999.
H.R. Rep. No. 106-861 at 4-5 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1374, 1377.
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to the federal courts with no clarification whatsoever. Thus, post-repeal, it
is once again necessary to determine whether a sound recording can qualify
under any of the enumerated categories of specially commissioned works.
It appears that, until recently, record companies had simply assumed
that sound recordings fit one or more of the "specially commissioned"
categories, 25 an assumption that has, at times, been shared by the Register
of Copyrights. 26 Until the late 1990s, however, the courts had never
examined that assumption. When the issue was finally litigated, the courts
rejected every attempt to fit sound recordings into the enumerated
27
categories.
In the only appellate decision on this issue, the Fifth Circuit in 1997
held, in Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Services, Inc., that the category of
"audiovisual works" in the work-made-for-hire definition did not include
28
purely audio works such as sound recordings.
Two years later, a federal district court held in Ballas v. Tedesco29 that
the sound recordings at issue in that case 30 were "not a work for hire under
the second part of the statute because they do not fit within any of the nine
enumerated categories," 3 1 and added that "[t]he definition does not provide
that a sound recording standing alone qualifies as a work for hire under
25. Copyright Status of Sound Recordings: Hearing Before House Subcomm. on Courts
& Intellectual Prop., Comm. on Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Hilary Rosen, President
and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America) ("Sound recordings were already eligible for
work for hire status under pre-existing law. An amendment was not needed to make them so."); Sidney
A. Diamond, Sound Recordings and Phonorecords: History and Current Law, 1979 ILL. L. FORUM
337, 357-58 (stating that sound recordings "almost invariably come under the 'work made for hire'
provisions of the Act").
26. "In the United States, where sound recordings are protected generally as works made for hire,
they are under copyright for at least 75 years." Copyright Term, Film Labeling, & Film Preservation
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, & H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
& Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 176-78 (1995) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
27. Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1997); Staggers v.
Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999); Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531,
541 (D.N.J. 1999).
28. Lulirama, Ltd., 128 F.3d at 878.
29. 41 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 1999).
30. The recordings at issue consisted of music from the film Titanic which had been arranged for
competitive ballroom dancing. Id. at 533-34. The plaintiff, a ballroom dancer, had made no creative
contribution to the recordings; he was neither an author of the underlying musical compositions nor a
performer on the recordings. Id. at 539-40 & n.20. He invoked the work-made-for-hire rules in an
effort to defeat the sole authorship claim of the record's producer, who had been commissioned by the
plaintiff to produce the CD for a $15,000 fee. Id. at 534.
31. Id. at 541. The court added that the sound recordings at issue also failed to qualify as works
made for hire for a second, independent, reason-the absence of a signed, written agreement between
the parties. Id.
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§ 101(2). ''32 Later that same year, the district court opinion in Staggers v.
Real Authentic Sound33 cited Lulirama, Ltd. and Ballas in holding that "a
sound recording does not fit within any of the nine categories" of
34
commissioned works enumerated in the statutory definition.
Although the narrow holding in Lulirama, Ltd. makes sense as a
matter of statutory construction, it does not foreclose the possibility that
sound recordings might qualify under one of the eight enumerated
categories other than "audiovisual works." In contrast, the two district
court opinions reach the sweeping conclusion that sound recordings fit into
none of the enumerated categories. Neither opinion, however, attempts to
analyze the individual categories and explain why none should be
interpreted to include sound recordings. 35 Nor do these opinions
distinguish between sound recordings in general and the specific sound
recordings at issue in these two cases. Both opinions appear to articulate a
per se rule that sound recordings as a class cannot fit within any of the nine
categories.
Neither of the district court opinions indicates whether the party
asserting work-made-for-hire status made any attempt to argue that a sound
recording could qualify as a work made for hire on the ground that each
recorded song on an album typically has been "specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work" or "as a
compilation." Yet, it was apparently on this basis that record companies
assumed, for many years, that sound recordings could be works made for
hire. 36 The record companies' assumption is even endorsed in the
37
legislative history of the 1999 amendment.
32. Id.
33. 77 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999).
34. id. at 64.
35. For one commentator's attempt to undertake the more rigorous analysis that the district
courts so casually omitted, see Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1040-45.
36. See Congress Repeals 1999 Copyright Act, supra note 22; Jerome N. Epping, Jr., Comment,
Harmonizing the United States and European Community Copyright Terms: Needed Adjustment or
Moneyfor Nothing?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 198 (1996).
Ironically, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., the plaintiff record label argued that each
individual track on a CD should constitute a separate work for the purpose of determining statutory
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000), because each track had "independent economic value."
109 F. Supp. 2d 223, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The district court rejected that argument, holding that a
music CD is a "compilation," and thus constitutes a single work for purposes of § 504(c). UMG
Recordings, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
37. For example, the amendment is described as merely "a technical and clarifying change to the
definition of a 'work made for hire."' H.R. Rep. No. 106-464 at 105 (1999). As the Conference Report
explained:
Sound recordings have been registered in the Copyright Office as works made for hire since
being protected in their own right. This clarifying amendment shall not be deemed to imply

HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 382 2001-2002

2002]

RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS

Nothing in the pre-1999 legislative history of the current copyright
statutes, however, supports the proposition that Congress intended to treat
sound recordings as contractual works made for hire when it enacted the
1976 Act. The legislative history of the Sound Recordings Act of 1971
("1971 Act"),3 8 which first extended federal copyright protection to sound
recordings, states that:
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not
always, involve "authorship" both on the part of the performers whose
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer
responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to
make the final sound recording. There may be cases where the record
producer's contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only
copyrightable element in the work, and there may be cases (for example,
recordings of birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the
record producer's contribution is copyrightable. As in the case of motion
pictures, the bill does not fix the authorship, or the resulting ownership
of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the employment
relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.39
This statement was written against the backdrop of the work-madefor-hire definition contained in the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"),
which, although literally applicable only to employment relationships, by
1971 had been judicially interpreted to include most commissioned works,
regardless of their nature, even in the absence of a written work-made-forhire agreement.4 ° Under the 1909 Act, the term "author" included "an
employer in the case of works made for hire,"' but these terms were
otherwise undefined. Early case law excluded commissioned works from
the definition, 42 but many courts held that the copyright in such works was
implicitly assigned by the creator to the commissioning party. 43 By the
that any sound recording or any other work would not otherwise qualify as a work made for
hire in the absence of the amendment ....
Id. at 106.
38. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
39. H.R. Rep. No. 92-487 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570.
40. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). See also Mary
LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint
Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 211-12 (2001) (reviewing this history).
41. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23 Stat. 1075, 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1978).
42. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 743-45; Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp.
847, 855-56 (D.N.J. 1981) (collecting authorities).
43. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 744. See, e.g., Lin-Brook Builders Hardware
v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221
F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939); Cory v.
Physical Culture Hotel, 88 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1937); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F.
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1970s, courts had merged this "presumptive assignment" concept with the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, and began to treat commissioned works as
works made for hire even without express Congressional authorization.4 4
Beginning in the 1960s, however, Congress was drafting a new workmade-for-hire definition for inclusion in the 1976 Act.45 When the Sound
Recordings Act of 1971 was enacted, Congress had already drafted most of
the work-made-for-hire definition that was ultimately enacted in 1976.46
This passage from the legislative history of the 1971 Act clearly recognizes
that authorship and ownership are different statuses, and while it leaves
open the possibility that each status may be the result of bargaining, it does
not affirmatively endorse the assignability of authorship (as opposed to
ownership).
Congress spent nearly fifteen years negotiating, drafting, and revising
the language in the work-made-for-hire definition.4 7 Much of this
deliberation focused on which categories of specially commissioned
copyrightable works should be eligible for contractually-created workmade-for-hire status. The 1965 version of the bill identified only four
categories of works eligible for this status-works created "as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture, as a

550 (2d Cir. 1922); Lumiere v. Pathe Exch., 275 F. 428 (2d Cir. 1921). Under the 1909 Act, common
law copyright transfers (assignments and exclusive licenses) did not have to be in writing, which
allowed the courts to evolve this notion of implied assignment. See I Nimmer on Copyright, supra note
21, at § 5.03[B][2][c] (May 2000). In contrast, under the 1976 Act assignments and exclusive licenses
of copyrights must be in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000); id. § 101 (defining a copyright "transfer").
44. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322,
1327 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that during the last ten years of the 1909 Act, courts had expanded the
work-made-for-hire category to include works created outside of traditional employment relationships,
"as long as the hiring party had the 'right to control or supervise the artist's work'), cert. denied, 121
S.Ct. 881 (2001); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 325-27 (5th Cir. 1987) (tracing the evolution of the "presumptive assignment" rule into a
broadened "work made for hire" definition). See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1310-11
(5th Cir. 1978); Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publ'ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974); Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972); Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill
Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally I Nimmer on Copyright, supra note
21, § 5.03[B][1][a][i] (describing judicial expansion of work-made-for-hire concept in last dozen years
of 1909 Act to include hiring parties that had right to control or supervise).
45. The 1976 Act limited works made for hire to works created by bona fide employees and to
works of specific types created pursuant to written work-made-for-hire agreements, 17 U.S.C. § 101,
and required all copyright assignments (other than by operation of law) to be in writing, id. § 204(a).
46. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
47. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 743-47 (recounting this history); Rafoth, supra
note 4, at 1048-50 (similar).
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translation, or as a supplementary work. '48 The Supreme Court described
Congress' rationale for selecting these categories as follows:
The interested parties selected these categories because they concluded
that these commissioned works, although not prepared by employees and
thus not covered by the first subsection, nevertheless should be treated as
works for hire because they were ordinarily prepared "at the instance,
direction, and risk of a publisher or producer." The Supplementary
Report [of the Register of Copyrights] emphasized that only the "four
special cases specifically mentioned" could qualify as works made for
hire; "[o]ther works made 4on
special order or commission would not
9
come within the definition."
As of 1966-five years before the Sound Recordings Act was
enacted-Congress had already extensively debated which categories of
works could be contractual works made for hire, without ever considering
sound recordings as an eligible category, no doubt because, at that time,
sound recordings were not even eligible for federal copyright protection.
In 1966, four more categories of commissioned works were addedcompilations, instructional texts, tests, and atlases. 50 The only substantive
change between the 1966 version and § 101 as enacted in 1976 was the
addition of "answer material for a test" in the 1976 bill. 5 1 Thus, even
though Congress granted federal copyright protection to sound recordings
in the 1971 Act, and even though it continued to deliberate on the scope of
works made for hire after 1971, it continued to omit sound recordings from
the list of commissioned works eligible for work-made-for-hire status.
Although in 1975 Congress considered adding one other category of
works to the enumerated list-"photographic or other portrait[s]" 5 2-this
proposal was rejected on the advice of the Register of Copyrights, who
argued that:
The addition of portraits to the list of commissioned works that can be
made into "works made for hire" by agreement of the parties is difficult
to justify. Artists and photographers are among the most vulnerable and
poorly protected of all the beneficiaries of copyright law, and it seems
clear that, like serious composers and choreographers, they were not
48.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 746 (citing S. 1006, H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,

H.R.6835, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1965)).

49.
50.

Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 89-2237, at 115-16 (1966).

51.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 747.

52. This category was actually included in the version of the 1976 Act originally passed by the
Senate, S.22, 94th Cong., § 101 (1975), but was deleted from the version that was ultimately enacted.
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 747. See also 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note
21, § 5.03[B][2][c] n. 155 (May 2000).
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intended to be treated as "employees" under the carefully negotiated
definition in § 101.53
Thus, at no point in the lengthy evolution of the work-made-for-hire
definition were sound recordings considered for inclusion in the
commissioned works category. Similarly, the legislative history of the
1971 Act, which was enacted five years after the new work-made-for-hire
definition had been drafted, says nothing about assigning work-made-forhire status to sound recordings created as commissioned works. The
legislative history of the 1976 Act incorporates verbatim a number of
passages from the legislative history of the 1971 Sound Recordings Act.54
In fact, Congress enacted the 1971 Act (rather than simply waiting to
address sound recording copyrights in the 1976 Act) in'order to avoid any
55
unnecessary delay in granting copyright protection to sound recordings.
Because the § 101 work-made-for-hire definition was substantially
complete even before Congress passed the 1971 Act, Congress could not
have been under the impression, in either 1971 or 1976, that sound
recordings already qualified as works made for hire in the absence of an
employment relationship. It is especially difficult to believe that Congress
passed the 1976 Act either assuming or intending that commissioned sound
recordings would qualify as works made for hire, yet failed to make the
slightest mention of that intent in the 1971 Act, the 1976 Act, or the
accompanying legislative reports. Indeed, in light of Congress' lengthy
deliberations on the categories of works that could be the subject of valid
work-made-for-hire agreements, the absence of sound recordings from the
§ 101 definition as enacted in 1976-indeed, the complete absence of any
discussion of sound recordings in the history of that section-contrasts
sharply with the explicit inclusion of motion pictures and audiovisual
works in the statutory language itself.
Throughout Congress' deliberations on the 1976 Act, the contractual
work-made-for-hire provisions included only two categories of works that
53. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 747 n.13 (quoting Second Supplementary
Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1975
Revision Bill, Chapter XI, 12-13 (1975)).
54. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 659 F.2d 963, 967-68 n5. (9th Cir. 1981)
(quoting 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21 § 13.05[F][51 at 13-96 n.159 (1981)), rev'd on other
grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting that 1976 Act incorporated the primary elements of the 1971 Act); Agee v.
Paramount Communications, 853 F. Supp. 778, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (using 1971 Act's legislative
history to construe § 114 of the 1976 Act, and noting that the latter "incorporated the primary elements
of the Sound Recording Act"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995).
55. H.R. Rep. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N 1566, 1569; Diamond, supra
note 25, at 350.
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might reasonably be interpreted to include sound recordings 56 compilations and collective works. Arguably, most commercially
distributed music recordings fit the definition of both a "compilation" and a
"collective work," as those terms are used in § 101. 57 Thus, a reasonable
argument can be made that the record companies have always qualified as
authors of such works, provided that they executed work-made-for-hire
agreements with the individual artists involved. For purposes of this
argument, the reference to "compilations" in § 101 would not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a record label is the author of each recorded
performance on a CD. To say that a record company is the author of a
"compilation" means only that the record company has authored the
selection and arrangement of copyrightable works contained in that
compilation, rather than the individual works that it comprises. 58 The
definition of works made for hire, however, applies differently to
compilations than it does to collective works; specifically, it applies to "a
work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, [or]

...

as

a compilation."

Thus, in the case of

compilations, the statute allows work-made-for-hire status for the selection
and arrangement of individual components, but does not provide for workmade-for-hire status for the individual components themselves. In contrast,
in the case of a collective work, each contribution to the collection is
expressly stated to be eligible for work-made-for-hire status. 59 Thus, the
individual recorded performances on an album would seem to qualify as
works made for hire if they are "specially ordered or commissioned" as a
contribution to the collected works included on the album.

56.
57.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "sound recordings").
Section 101 defines these terms as follows:
A "collective work" is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves,
are assembled into a collective whole.
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" includes
collective works.

Id.
58. Id. § 103(b).
59. Many works can be both a contribution to a compilation and a contribution to a collective
work. A collective work is simply a narrower classification than a compilation. The difference is that a
collective work is a compilation of "separate and independent" works, which excludes "compilations of
information or other uncopyrightable material and works published with editorial revisions or
annotations." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "compilations" and "collective works"). Copyrightable contributions that fit
into both categories can be contractual works made for hire, since nothing in § 101 forecloses workmade-for-hire status for an individual copyrightable contribution to a compilation.
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If Congress intended to include sound recordings in the "collective
works" category for purposes of the work-made-for-hire definition, it
seems odd that the legislative history of the "work made for hire" and
"collective works" definitions does not even mention sound recordings;
especially in light of the fact that the 1971 Act was enacted between the
drafting of these definitions and their enactment into law, indicating that
Congress was acutely aware when it enacted the 1976 Act that sound
recordings constituted a new and distinct category of copyrightable works.
Yet, the House Report lists only "periodical issues, anthologies, symposia,
and collections of the discrete writings of the same authors" as examples of
collective works. 60 The last category is broad enough to include sound
recordings, but the omission of any specific reference to them still suggests
that when Congress included collective works in the work-made-for-hire
definition it was unaware that this category might be interpreted to include
most sound recordings.
Thus, it seems quite clear that in its deliberations leading to the workmade-for-hire provisions in the 1976 Act, Congress did not consider
whether sound recordings should be eligible for this status. Although
Congress granted copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971,61 just
five years before the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, the legislative
history of the work-made-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act does not
mention sound recordings at all. When one considers the fact that the
categories included in the final version of the work-made-for-hire
definition were the product of nearly fifteen years of deliberation and
compromise, 62 this omission is significant. As the Supreme Court noted in
CCNV, where it rejected a broad interpretation of the "employee" prong of
the work-made-for-hire test, "[s]trict adherence to the language and
structure of the Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, a statute is
the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises." 6 3 A narrow
interpretation of the enumerated categories seems even more appropriate
when one considers that in spite of the many interest groups that
participated in crafting the work-made-for-hire provisions-including

60. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122.
61.
Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
62. See supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text, Congress began deliberation on the workmade-for-hire provision in 1961, and while most of its content was settled by 1966, the last revisions
were not in place until 1975. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743-49
(1989).
63. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 748 n.14.
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literary authors, publishers, composers, and lyricists-recording artists and
65
record labels did not participate.
Nonetheless, as a matter of plain-language statutory interpretation, the
typical sound recording consists of multiple musical performances, and is
therefore "collective." Thus, the "collective works" category is literally
broad enough to include such sound recordings, even without any specific
mention thereof in the legislative history. Accordingly, there is a strong
argument, based on the literal language of the statute, that the inclusion of
"a contribution to a collective work" in the list of works eligible for workmade-for-hire status makes the typical commercial sound recording eligible
66
for such status.
64. Id. at 746 n. 12 (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 134 (1965)).
65. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 746 n. 12.
66. In general, commentators have neglected to give adequate consideration to this "collective
work" argument. Often, they treat it as subsumed within the "compilation" argument, and reject it
(implicitly or explicitly) accordingly. See, e.g., M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS
BUSINESS OF Music: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 204 (8th ed. 2000) (recognizing

but reaching no conclusion on the compilation argument and failing to raise a separate collective work
argument); Jane C. Ginsburg, Domestic and International Copyright Issues Implicated in the
Compilation of a Multimedia Product, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397, 1408 (1995) (stating that "the
categories of commissioned works capable of being works made for hire do not include sound
recordings," but citing no authority); Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1042-44 (analyzing the compilation
argument and implying that this analysis defeats the collective work argument as well).
The fact that record labels frequently release one or two tracks from a CD as "singles," it has
been suggested, indicates that the artist is really contracting to produce individual song recordings
rather than an entire compilation. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra, at 204 (discussing but not
endorsing this argument). This argument is not persuasive. Under current industry practice, a
recording artist typically contracts to produce CDs that contain multiple songs. The fact that particular
recorded songs from this collection may be selected for individual release-largely for the purpose of
promoting the compilation-does not negate the fact that they were originally commissioned for
inclusion in a compilation. Cf UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223, 224-25
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting record label's argument that each individual track on a CD is a separate
work for purposes of determining statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).
Interestingly, another commentator reaches the same conclusion through the opposite rationale.
In contrast to the argument that the recorded performances on a CD are not parts of a collective work
because they are created as free-standing individual "singles," this commentator has suggested that such
performances are not parts of a collective work because the entire album constitutes a single unitary
work. Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1043. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. It is, of course, true that
some sound recordings are not collective works at all-for example, operas, recordings of plays, most
"books on tape," and some sound effects recordings and comedy recordings. An individual track from
an album, when released as a "single" for radio air play and other marketing purposes, would not itself
be a collective work, although it would still be a part of a collective work because it is one of several
tracks on the album. Because the copyright statutes do not define a "work," some copyrightable sound
recordings may fall close to the line between collective works and individual multi-faceted works.
While an opera may not be a collective work, because its individual components flow into one another
with a degree of continuity that resembles the continuous flow of scenes in a play or a motion picture,
popular music albums would seem to fall on the other side of the line. The individual performances are
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The federal courts are certainly well equipped to resolve this conflict
as a matter of statutory interpretation and, left to their own devices, they
will do so, even if it means that the Supreme Court must ultimately step in
to resolve a circuit split. Yet, regardless of how the courts answer the
question under current law, their answer is hardly a substitute for
deliberative policymaking. Until its recent flip-flop on the issue, Congress
had paid little attention to the authorship status of sound recordings, or the
impact of that status on termination rights. 67 Thus, regardless of the federal
courts' ability to decide whether sound recordings are works made for hire
under current law, the significance of this issue as a matter of policy makes
it far more important to address the question whether sound recordings
should qualify as works made for hire.
For these reasons, any judicial resolution of the statutory interpretation
question will be less satisfactory than a clear statement of congressional
intent, based on careful consideration of the competing interests at stake.
Accordingly, recording artists, record labels, and the consuming public, are
entitled to a well-considered congressional resolution of this issue.
III. ALTERNATIVES
In responding to the uncertain status of sound recordings, Congress
has several options. One option is to do nothing. This is the approach
Congress chose in its repeal of the sound recordings amendment in 2000,
leaving it to the federal courts, and ultimately, perhaps, the Supreme Court,
to determine whether sound recordings can be contractual works made for
hire. In choosing this option, Congress avoided addressing the underlying
policy question of the extent to which musical performers and other
contributors to sound recordings should enjoy authorship rights in those
normally recorded separately rather than in one continuous recording session. The end of one
performance does not usually flow seamlessly into the beginning of the next one. Each recorded
performance is typically performed separately from the rest of the album (and, indeed, in public
performances an album is almost never performed in its entirety). In addition, individual recorded
performances from an album are selectively released by the record label as "singles" for radio play, are
considered for various music industry awards apart from the rest of the album, are typically licensed
separately from the rest of the album (for use in motion picture soundtracks, background music
services, or television commercials, for example), and are treated as separate works by music critics
writing reviews of the album and by performing rights societies, such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC,
which monitor public performances of the musical compositions included in those recorded
performances. Thus, even though an artist or producer may use an underlying theme or idea to
determine which performances to include on an album, and in what sequence, the performances on a
typical popular music album would seem to fit comfortably into the category of "contributions to
collective works."
67. Cf supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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recordings. If the trend of current case law continues, the courts will
ultimately hold that sound recordings cannot be contractual works for hire
under § 101. As discussed above, this resolution is not inevitable, but it is
reasonable and perhaps even persuasive, as a matter of statutory
interpretation. As a matter of public policy, however, it leads to troubling
consequences which are outlined in Part III.A below.
Of course, Congress could affirmatively amend the Copyright Act to
state unambiguously that sound recordings cannot be contractual works
made for hire. While this would unburden the courts, it would also lead to
the same troubling consequences as achieving this result through the courts.
Alternatively, Congress can amend the Copyright Act either (1) to
permit sound recordings to qualify as contractual works made for hire, or
(2) to allow parties by contract to confer on sound recordings certain
characteristics that would make them, for most practical purposes, the
Those
functional equivalent of contractual works made for hire.
characteristics would include a copyright term that is not dependent on the
life of an author, and the assignability, waivability, or elimination of
termination rights as discussed in Parts III.B and III.C below.
The first option-the one that Congress selected in the retroactive
2000 legislation-is the worst way to address the sound recordings issue.
First, the authorship rules for sound recordings are an important and
sensitive matter that should be resolved only after a careful assessment of
the competing public and private interests. Second, the outcome of such a
careful assessment is likely to be contrary to the recent holdings of the
federal courts that have interpreted the work-made-for-hire definition under
the 1976 Act because treating sound recordings as ineligible for contractual
work-made-for-hire status, while arguably a correct interpretation of the
1976 Act, nonetheless presents serious problems of impracticability. And
third, in the course of this assessment, Congress may be able to resolve
some issues arising from the convergence of computer, audio, and
audiovisual technologies that could, in the very near future, make it
increasingly difficult to apply those copyright rules that have tacitly relied
on neatly classifying works according to the traditional copyright
categories identified in § 102.68

68.

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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A. OPTION 1: RETAINING THE STATUS Quo

If Congress does nothing, and if courts continue to hold that sound
recordings are not eligible for contractual work-made-for-hire status, then
sound recordings of music will in most cases have to be classified as joint
works because they involve significant creative contributions from several
parties who share the intent to merge those contributions into a unitary
whole. 69 The identity of the complete joint authorship group will often be
highly uncertain because most sound recordings involve the participation of

several musicians and vocalists; one or more producers, sound engineers,
or both; one or more composers and lyricists who may create compositions
70
specifically for the recording; and perhaps other creative participants.
Because authorship, for copyright purposes, can never be determined or
altered by contract except under a valid work-made-for-hire agreement, 7' in
69. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a joint work as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole." Id. § 101. The legislative history of the 1976 Act acknowledges that sound
recordings will frequently have multiple authors:
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve
"authorship" both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the
part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound
recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer's contribution is so
minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the work, and there may be
cases (for example, recordings of birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the
record producer's contribution is copyrightable.
H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669.
70. The many problems inherent in determining which participants in a collaborative effort are
entitled to joint author status are well documented. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227,
1231-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering whether an expert consultant's contribution to a motion picture
constitutes "authorship"); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200-02 (2d Cir. 1998) (disregarding
substantiality of putative co-author's contribution to a work, on the ground that dominant author's lack
of subjective intent to share authorship was sufficient in itself to defeat joint authorship claim);
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-71 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that joint authorship
requires that each party make an independently copyrightable contribution and intend one another tobe
joint authors); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504-08 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that each co-author's
contribution must be independently copyrightable, but noting contrary views on this "troublesome"
issue; also holding that both authors must subjectively intend to "regard themselves as joint authors,"
even though this requirement does not appear in the literal language of the copyright statutes);
I Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, at §§ 6.01-6.07; Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old
Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257 (1996);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2000); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Author-Stories: "Narratives
Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S.CAL. L. REV. 1(2001);
LaFrance, supra note 40, at 194-203, 255-63; Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation:
The Current State of Joint Work Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REV. 43 (1997); Russ VerSteeg, Defining
"Author"forPurposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1323 (1996).
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the absence of such an agreement, the uncertainties regarding putative joint
authorship cannot be eliminated.72
Although recording contracts typically assign copyright ownership to
the record label, that assignment remains subject to the authors' nonwaivable statutory termination rights.73 Thus, when the statutory time
frame for termination arrives, 74 any uncertainty regarding the work's
authorship will make it difficult to determine who may validly terminate
the grant, 75 and whether a sufficient majority of the joint authors have
joined in the decision to terminate.76 The same uncertainty will undermine

71.
An assignment only affects ownership; it does not change the identity of the author, who in
many cases retains significant rights as a matter of law. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b), 201(d), 203(a),
304(c); LaFrance, supra note 40, at 242 n. 205, 247-48 nn.228-30.
72. Even where the authorship of a sound recording is addressed through litigation, this resolves
the authorship dispute only as between the litigants; other contributors to the recording who are not
parties to the litigation are free to raise their own joint work claims in the future. With respect to works
that are eligible for work-made-for-hire status, the use of a work-made-for-hire contract removes this
uncertainty with respect to all creative contributions made by the parties who execute the contracts.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (allowing an author to terminate a copyright assignment or license
executed on or after January 1, 1978); id. § 304(c) (allowing the author or other party in whom the
renewal term vests to terminate a copyright assignment or license executed before January 1, 1978, if
the work in question enjoyed copyright protection on that date). The termination right under § 203
applies only to grants by authors, id. § 203(a); the § 304(c) termination right applies to the owner(s) of
the renewal copyright, who may or may not be the author(s) of the work, as designated in
section§ 304(a)(1)(C), id. § 304(c).
74. Under § 203, a license or assignment of copyright by an author may be terminated during the
five-year period that begins thirty-five years (or forty years, in certain cases) after the grant was
executed. Id. § 203(a)(3). Under § 304, a license or assignment of copyright by an author may be
terminated once, during a five-year period commencing either at the end of the fifty-sixth year of the
copyright (or on January 1, 1978, if later) or at the end of the seventy-fifth year of the copyright. Id.
§§ 304(c)(3), 304(d).
75. Under § 203, a grant may be terminated by a majority of the authors who executed it. Id.
§ 203(a)(1). Under § 304, a joint author may terminate the grant "to the extent of [that] particular
author's share in the ownership of the renewal copyright." Id. § 304(c)(1). Under either provision, the
share of a deceased author can be exercised only by a majority of the persons who succeed to that
author's interest. Id. §§ 203(a)(1 )-(2), 304(c)(I )-(2).
76. Where a work has joint authors, termination under § 203 will be effective only if (1) in the
case of a grant by one of the authors, that author (or that author's statutory successors under § 203(a)(2)
who control more than half of that author's termination rights) terminates the grant, or (2) in the case of
a grant by two or more joint authors, a majority of the authors who executed the grant (including a
majority of the statutory successors of any deceased author who executed the grant) join in terminating
the grant. Id. § 203(a)(1).
Because § 304 allows any joint author (or statutory successor) to terminate a grant, but only to the
extent of that author's share of the renewal copyright, it appears that unanimity is required to terminate
a grant completely under § 304; anything less than a unanimous termination would appear to leave the
grantee with a non-exclusive license, as though the grant had been executed by a single joint author in
the first place. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, § 11.03 [A][ 1] (May 2000).
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efforts to determine who owns the rights upon termination,7 7 and
accordingly, who has the power to assign or license those rights after
78
termination.
Record labels might try to argue that the album itself is a derivative
work which is based on each of the underlying recorded contributions of
the individual performers, producers, or both. If that were the case, record
labels would be entitled to continue exploiting the recorded compilation
even after one or more performers or producers had exercised their
termination rights. 79 This argument might draw an analogy to motion
pictures, which the 1976 House Report indicates should be treated as
derivative works with respect to their underlying screenplays. 80 Thus, even
if a writer terminates the license to create a motion picture based on the
screenplay, the existing motion picture still can be exploited, although a
remake would infringe. The analogy is too weak to be persuasive,
however. The contribution to a sound recording that is most similar to a
screenplay is the musical composition-the individual vocal and
instrumental performances, and the creativity injected by the producer,
engineer, or both, are more analogous to the contributions of the actors and
director of a motion picture, which, absent a written work-made-for-hire
agreement, would be considered contributions to a joint work rather than
independently copyrightable underlying works from which a separate
motion picture copyright is derived.
As an alternative route to invoking the derivative works exception,
record labels might argue that an album is a derivative work because it is a
collective work and that collective works are themselves a type of
derivative work. Although the literal text of the "derivative work"
definition is broad enough to support this argument,8' § 101 provides a

77. Upon termination, all rights covered by the terminated grant revert to the author(s) and/or
other persons owning termination interests, including those who did not join in signing the notice of
termination. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6), 304(d).
78. The rules for determining who may execute a post-termination grant are the same as those for
determining who may terminate a grant. Id. §§ 203(b)(3), 304(c)(6).
79. See id. §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6) (derivative works exceptions).
80. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5741;
3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, at § I1.02[C][1I (Dec. 2000).
81.
Section 101 provides:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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totally separate definition for "collective work," and neither of these
definitions cross-references the other. In contrast, Congress expressly
acknowledged the overlap between compilations and collective works
through a cross-reference in the "compilation" definition which clarifies
that collective works are a subset of compilations.8 2 In the absence of
similar statutory language, or legislative history, indicating that collective
works are also a subset of derivative works, it seems unlikely that a court
would construe the reference to "derivative works" in §§ 203 and 304 (the
termination provisions) as encompassing collective works as well. Indeed,
the House Report suggests that a key difference between compilations and
derivative works is that, in the former case, the preexisting materials are
merely assembled, whereas in the latter case, they are internally altered. In
this context, it seems clear that the Report's reference to compilations
includes collective works:
A "compilation" results from a process of selecting, bringing together,
organizing, and arranging previously existing material of all kinds,
regardless of whether the individual items in the material have been or
ever could have been subject to copyright. A "derivative work," on the
recasting, transforming, or adapting
other hand, requires a process of
"one or more preexisting works." 83
As this discussion indicates, continuing to deny work-made-for-hire
eligibility to sound recordings is likely to lead to costly, repetitive, and
tedious litigation regarding whether, and by whom, a grant of rights in a
sound recording may be terminated. Such uncertainty, and the attendant
expense, impedes the market for copyrighted works, and benefits neither

82. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
83. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57. The Nimmer treatise expands on this notion:
[Wihile a compilation consists merely of the selection and arrangement of pre-existing
material without any internal changes in such material, a derivative work involves recasting or
transformation, i.e., changes in the pre-existing material, whether or not it is juxtaposed in an
arrangement with other pre-existing materials. A catalog constitutes a compilation, and a
translation of a pre-existing work constitutes a derivative work.
I Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, § 3.02 (May 2000) (citation omitted). The same treatise,
however, also questions Congress' decision to establish different substantive rules for collective works
and for derivative works, since both combine original elements with preexisting works:
A collective work more nearly resembles a derivative work than it does other forms of
compilation. Both collective works and derivative works are based upon pre-existing works
that are in themselves capable of copyright. The fact that the originality called for in a
collective work consists of the collection and assembling of pre-existing works, while
derivative work originality lies in the manner in which a pre-existing work is transformed,
would not appear to justify a difference in substantive treatment, and hence, not require a
terminological distinction. Collective works might well have been regarded as a form of
derivative work, but that is not the terminology adopted by the drafters of the current
Copyright Act.
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authors nor consumers. 84 Although it may be too late to eliminate the
problem with respect to subsisting sound recording copyrights, with respect
to future works, a decision to leave current law unchanged is an affirmative
decision to impair the marketability of all future sound recordings.
How serious a problem would this be? Much depends on the value of
the terminated rights. The copyright in an average sound recording (as
distinct from the copyrighted musical compositions performed thereon) is
unlikely to have great economic value thirty-five years after its release,
even if the sound recording were commercially successful when first
released. Some recordings, however, will have enormous market value
decades after their initial release, as illustrated by the continuing popularity
of the Beatles' original recordings. In addition, even a recording that has
little economic value after thirty-five years may have historic or artistic
value to one or more of its creators. If current copyright law preserves
termination rights in these instances, then if one of the creators of such a
recording (or one of their statutory successors under § 203 or 304)85 seeks
to exercise a termination right in order to regain full or partial ownership of
the copyright, unless the record label or current copyright owner (if that
owner can be located at all) is willing to relinquish the copyright, there is
likely to be litigation between the artist and the record label.86 The record
label could take the position, in many cases quite correctly, that the
plaintiff does not constitute "a majority of the authors" who executed the
original grant to the record company, since the plaintiff was probably one
of several performers and other co-creators who could qualify as a joint
author of the recording. Such a dispute would require a court to determine
the identity of every person who was a joint author of the recording, thirty-

84. Courts interpreting the 1976 Act have frequently emphasized the importance of predictability
in making copyrighted works marketable. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 749-50 (1989) ("Congress' paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act" was "enhancing
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership."); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559
(2d Cir. 1995); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the requirement of a signed writing to create work made for hire helps "to make the ownership of
property rights in intellectual property clear and definite, so that such property will be readily
marketable"). See also Marci A. Hamilton, Commissioned Works As Works Made for Hire Under the
1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1304-05 (1987)
(cautioning that ambiguities in "work made for hire" definition could make it difficult for independent
contractors to establish clear title and thereby maximize the alienability of their copyrights).
85.
17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)(l)-(2).
86. In some cases, it may be difficult for the artist or statutory successor even to serve the
requisite notice of termination on the current owner of the sound recording copyright-for example,
where the record label that released the recording no longer exists and/or the rights in question have
been divided among several assignees or have been the subject of a series of assignments. See id.
§§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4).
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five years or more after its creation, when memories have faded and the
evidentiary trail is cold. Joint authorship is difficult enough to determine
on a full evidentiary record. 7
Without legislative intervention to eliminate these uncertainties,
parties interested in avoiding litigation will be relegated to self-help. The
best an artist could accomplish under these circumstances is to assemble an
evidentiary record that documents the authorship of a work so persuasively
that other interested parties would be discouraged from challenging their
claims in court. Artists are extremely unlikely, however, to document
contemporaneously the evidence relevant to joint authorship determinations
and to retain that evidence for thirty-five years. At best, self-help for artists
requires them to double as lawyers, which hardly contributes to copyright's
goal of fostering creativity for the benefit of the public. 88 At worst, selfhelp for artists is simply no help at all. Even a strong evidentiary record
does not guarantee a successful joint authorship determination. Moreover,
the evidentiary record assembled by either the artist or the record label is
likely to be incomplete in a self-serving manner, and thus it is unlikely to
lead to an accurate determination of authorship.
Record companies, however, can explore a self-help option, which
may allow them to preclude the exercise of termination rights even without
litigation. As discussed below, if record companies are permitted to
achieve this result, they will be able to override the federal courts' recent
pro-artist decisions simply by rendering those decisions irrelevant.
As noted earlier, record labels cannot rely on either the "specially
commissioned" or the "employee" prong of the current work-made-for-hire
test as long as they continue to use their traditional methods of producing
sound recordings. If record companies wish to eliminate termination rights
in sound recordings, however, one way to accomplish this result with
respect to future works is simply to stop making sound recordings and to
make audiovisual works instead. Because any audio recording that is
created as a part of an audiovisual work is eligible for contractual work-

87. See generally LaFrance, supra note 40 (discussing problems in applying "joint work"
definition). Even worse, perhaps, is the specter of federal courts being flooded with suits for
declaratory judgments regarding joint authorship by record labels, artists, or both, seeking to establish
the identity of the joint authors while the evidentiary trail is still warm. Because the outcome of such
litigation would not bind putative co-authors who are not parties to the litigation, a single sound
recording could spawn multiple lawsuits.
88. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).

HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 397 2001-2002

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:375

made-for-hire status under § 101, termination rights in such a recording can
be eliminated through a written work-made-for-hire agreement.
Accomplishing this result should be quite easy. As delineated in
§ 101, the difference between sound recordings and audiovisual works is
slight, and the line is easy to cross technologically:
'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied.89
Under this definition, a fixation of sounds that would qualify in all
other respects as a sound recording will avoid that characterization if the
sounds are created to accompany an audiovisual work. Although the intent
of this provision was apparently to make clear that the audio portion of an
audiovisual work such as a motion picture is subject to the same copyright
rules as the visual portion of such a work, 9° the provision also makes it
possible to create musical recordings that escape sound recording
categorization because they satisfy the statutory definition of audiovisual
works, which provides:
89.
90.

17 U.S.C. § 101.
The 1976 House Report provides:
Sound tracks of motion pictures, long a nebulous area in American copyright law, are
specifically included in the definition of "motion pictures," and excluded in the definition of
"sound recordings." To be a "motion picture," as defined, requires three elements: (1) a
series of images, (2) the capability of showing the images in certain successive order, and (3)
an impression of motion when the images are thus shown. Coupled with the basic
requirements of original authorship and fixation in tangible form, this definition encompasses
a wide range of cinematographic works embodied in films, tapes, video disks, and other
media. However, it would not include: (1) unauthorized fixations of live performances or
telecasts, (2) live telecasts that are not fixed simultaneously with their transmission, or (3)
filmstrips and slide sets which, although consisting of a series of images intended to be shown
in succession, are not capable of conveying an impression of motion.
On the other hand, the bill equates audiovisual materials such as filmstrips, slide sets, and
sets of transparencies with "motion pictures" rather than with "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works." Their sequential showing is closer to a "performance" than to a
"display," and the definition of "audiovisual works," which applies also to "motion
pictures," embraces works consisting of a series of related images that are by their nature,
intended for showing by means of projectors or other devices.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. Like much of the
legislative history concerning sound recordings in the 1976 Act, this passage recalls language from the
House Report on the Sound Recordings Act of 1971:
In excluding the "sounds accompanying a motion picture" from the scope of this legislation
the Committee does not intend to limit or otherwise alter the rights that exist currently in
such works. The exclusion reflects the Committee's opinion that soundtracks or audio tracks
are an integral part of the "motion pictures" already accorded protection under subsections (1)
and (m) of Section I of title 17 [under the 1909 Act], and that the reproduction of the sound
accompanying a copyrighted motion picture is an infringement of copyright in the motion
picture ....
H.R. Rep. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570-71.
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"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or
other devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment,
together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are
embodied. 9 1
Many commercially available CDs already fit the description of
audiovisual works, because they incorporate a visual display which can be
viewed on a computer screen when the CD is placed in the computer's CDROM drive (hence their characterization as "enhanced CDs"). Because the
recorded music and the screen display can be enjoyed simultaneously, the
recorded music can qualify as a part of an audiovisual work, and thus can
fall outside of the "sound recording" category. A record label would not
even have to create an entire music video for this purpose; a simple
computer-generated series of images would be an inexpensive way to
accomplish this. 92 The only crucial step will be to ensure that the musical
recording is created as a part of the audiovisual work; if the musical
recording is created separately, and then incorporated into an audiovisual
work, the "sound recording" characterization will still apply to the musical
recording, and the audiovisual work will simply be a derivative work that
has no relevance in determining the proper categorization of the musical
recording.
What is the consequence of this self-help? Because audiovisual works
are eligible for work-made-for-hire status, in the future, record companies
can produce all of their musical recordings as works made for hire simply
by incorporating visual displays in the musical recordings and releasing
them exclusively (at least initially) as enhanced CDs or in similar
audiovisual formats (such as those which can be downloaded through the

91.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

92. Of course, some ambiguity arises from the statutory requirement that the images be "related"
to one another, and "intrinsically intended to be shown." The first requirement has been interpreted
liberally. See, e.g., WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 1982)
(treating news broadcast as "related" to teletext material covering subject matter different from that of
the news broadcast, and also as "related" to announcements of future programming, so as to constitute a
single audiovisual work, because each was "intended for the same audience during the same time
interval"). See generally 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, § 2.09[A] (Dec. 1999) (discussing
WGN case, and questioning whether the definition of "audiovisual works" encompasses works that
consist solely of textual "images," such as microfiche or microfilms of literary works, or works that
combine textual and other visual images). Although the phrase "intrinsically intended to be shown" has
not been judicially construed, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the images on an enhanced CD
are "intended to be shown."
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Internet). 93 If they also distribute their recordings in other audio-only
formats (such as mp3 files or phonorecords), these formats should be
created later in time, as derivative works based on the underlying
audiovisual work, in order to establish that the recorded music was created
specifically for inclusion in an audiovisual work, and was only later
converted into the derivative work, which consists purely of an audio
recording. Indeed, this status can and should be established in the workmade-for-hire contract itself, which should require each signatory artist,
producer, or technician to acknowledge that his or her contribution was
intended for inclusion in an audiovisual work, in addition to whatever
ancillary modes of exploitation the commissioning party might ultimately
pursue. Thus, to qualify a musical recording as a work made for hire, the
work-made-for-hire contract should specify that the recording is being
created specifically for inclusion in an audiovisual work. In addition, the
initial release of the recording probably should be in the audiovisual
format. 94
If these audiovisual recordings are prepared for a record label under
work-made-for-hire contracts, the label's ownership rights will not be
subject to termination. Thus, the record companies will have achieved
through self-help the same result they sought to achieve legislatively under
the short-lived 1999 amendment. As discussed below, however, there will
be other legal consequences, some favorable to the record companies and
some not.
Perhaps the most troubling of these consequences would be the
songwriters' loss of termination rights in at least some of their musical
compositions. Any musical composition that is created "as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work" is eligible for contractual workmade-for-hire status.
Record labels almost certainly would expect
performer-songwriters (other than those with significant bargaining power)
to sign work-made-for-hire contracts not only for their recorded
93. The record companies would need to obtain synchronization licenses from music publishers,
rather than mechanical licenses, in order to record the underlying musical compositions in the
audiovisual format rather than the sound recording format. A mechanical license, however, would still
be required for reproducing and distributing copies of the audiovisual work or phonorecords of the
sound recording. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 66, at 175-76, 261-62; RICHARD
SCHULENBERG,

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 263-64,

358-64 (1999) (explaining

synchronization and mechanical licenses).
94. Although public distribution is not a prerequisite to establishing that an audiovisual work has
been created, such a distribution would be helpful both as an evidentiary matter-to prove that the
audiovisual work had been created-and, more importantly, as a rebuttal to any suggestion that the
audiovisual work was a mere sham, created merely to disguise the fact that the real "work" in question
was the sound recording.
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performances, but also for any musical compositions created for those
performances.
This is already the normal practice when musical
compositions are commissioned for inclusion in motion picture
soundtracks. 95 There seems little doubt that the same practice would be
simply transferred to record label contracts.
There would be additional legal consequences to the anticipated selfhelp strategy as well. In addition to eliminating termination rights, record
companies that abandon traditional sound recordings in favor of
audiovisual recordings conceivably could benefit from the ability to
enforce a public performance right in their audiovisual works, since an
audio recording created as a component of an audiovisual work (such as a
motion picture) enjoys a public performance right that sound recordings do
not. 96 Creating musical recordings as components of audiovisual works
could generate enormous public performance royalties, which are currently
denied to sound recordings. 97 Thus, the record companies will have
achieved an end-run around the federal policy that denies public
performance rights to the owners of sound recording copyrights. 98 It
remains to be determined, however, whether the performance of only the
audio component of such an enhanced recording would be considered a
performance of the audiovisual work, or merely a performance of a
derivative sound recording, to which public performance rights would not
attach.
Producing audiovisual works instead of sound recordings could,
however, have a negative consequence for record labels, since they would
be unable to prohibit commercial rentals of those works under the first sale

95. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 66, at 260-61; SCHULENBERG, supra note 93, at
336.
96. The public performance right applies to "motion pictures and other audiovisual works" but
not to sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 114(a), "Sound recordings" are defined as "works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." Id. § 101.
"Audiovisual works," in contrast, are "works that consist of a series of related images ... together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
which the works are embodied." Id. § 101.
97. Id. § 106(4). In contrast, the public performance right in sound recordings is limited to
subscription digital audio transmissions. Id. §§ 106(6), 114(d)(1).
98. Whether this is a good or bad result is debatable. Many commentators have strongly
endorsed the creation of a public performance right in sound recordings, a view embraced by the
Register of Copyrights in a 1978 report to Congress. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 95TH CONG., REPORT
ON PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS: BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL
LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 1061-62

(Comm. Print 1978).
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rule, 99 which permits commercial rentals of all copyrighted works other
than sound recordings and computer software. 10 0 Commercial rentals
arguably increase the likelihood of widespread unauthorized copying,
which is the concern that led the record industry to seek exemption from
the first sale rule in the first place.' 0 ' Even if rentals were permitted,
however, improvements in copy protection technology, and statutory
prohibitions against circumvention of such technology, 0 2 might soon make
03
unauthorized copying less likely in the rental context.1
If the underlying premise is correct, and record companies can, with
little additional expense, place their products into the audiovisual works
category rather the sound recordings category, they can achieve significant
legal benefits not contemplated by Congress when it granted copyright
protection to sound recordings in 1971. Even if public performance
royalties are not attainable in this manner,"0 4 the termination of rights
problem will be eliminated. Thus, whatever the other legal consequences
of this change in their product line may be, the record companies already
have achieved a significant legal victory with respect to any musical
recordings which they have already created in the visually enhanced format
(except, of course, where the enhanced format was created as a derivative
work based on a preexisting sound recording, in which case the original
performers' contributions are arguably specially ordered or commissioned
for the sound recording, not the subsequent audiovisual work).
If record companies choose this self-help strategy, will Congress
intervene to restore the legal distinctions between sound recordings and
audiovisual works? Or will Congress, the public, and the relevant interest
groups simply accept these legal consequences as the inevitable result of
technological change, which has blurred the distinctions between aural and

99. This conclusion might not extend to rentals of any purely audio recordings that constitute
derivative works of the enhanced CDs. The answer would depend on whether these derivative
recordings are considered parts of the audiovisual work, in which case they should retain their public
performance rights, or separate sound recordings, to which only the § 106(6) performance right would
attach. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (b)(l)(A).
101. 2 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, § 8.12[B][7] (Sept. 2000).
102. See also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (creating a new cause of action for circumventing copy
protection measures).
103. In addition, the pervasive availability of unauthorized MP3 versions of sound recordingseasily accessed on the Internet-currently presents a much greater threat to the exclusive rights of
record companies. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
104. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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audiovisual works?' 0 5 This self-help strategy will almost certainly lead to
litigation over the distinctions between sound recordings and audiovisual
works, and between underlying and derivative works.
In contrast, if record companies continue to produce conventional
sound recordings, the courts will be required to determine whether sound
recordings fit into any of the work-made-for-hire categories. As discussed
earlier, the courts that have addressed this question thus far have uniformly
ruled that they do not. None of those decisions, however, has offered much
analysis to support this conclusion. In particular, the courts have failed to
address the argument, reasonable on its face, that most musical sound
recordings are created as contributions to collective works, since they
typically involve several individual recorded performances each of which
can be enjoyed independently of the others. By leaving this issue to the
courts, Congress' decision to do nothing eliminates the opportunity for a
reasoned consideration of public policy. This result is no more satisfactory
than the result that would follow from the record industry self-help
measures described above.
Ironically, many of the performers who have made the greatest
contributions to sound recordings may already have forfeited their
termination rights in those recordings. Those recording artists who render
their services through loan-out corporations 10 6 are in fact employees of
those corporations, and any performances they render in that capacity are
already works made for hire. When the loan-out corporation contracts with
a record label to "lend" the performer's exclusive services in carrying out
the recording contract, the artist is creating a work made for hire as an
employee of the loan-out, which is, therefore, the author of the artist's

105. The Nimmer treatise notes a similar breakdown in doctrinal distinctions between audiovisual
works, sound recordings, and computer software, using the example of interactive DVDs. 2 Nimmer on
Copyright, supra note 21, § 8.24[C] (Sept. 2000). See also id. § 8.12[B][7][c] (May 1999) (questioning
whether "books on tape" are subject to the rental restriction that applies to "sound recordings" under 17
U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)); Shira Perlmutter, Convergence and the Future of Copyright, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 163, 172 (2001) (noting that the "continuum of digital products-music video, DVD with
music and visual materials, etc." poses a "conundrum" in the context of a proposed international treaty
on audiovisual performances).
106. The term "loan-out corporation" refers to a corporation formed by an individual, who is
typically the sole employee of the corporation as well as its sole or controlling shareholder. The
corporation, rather than the individual, enters contracts with third parties to render the individual's
services in exchange for compensation that is payable to the corporation. Artists and others who
provide personal services through their corporations enjoy modest tax benefits as well as limited
liability. See generally SCHULENBERG, supra note 93, at 338-41 (discussing loan-out contracts); Mary
LaFrance, The Separate Tax Status of Loan-out Corporations,48 VAND. L. REV. 879, 884-904 (1995)
(outlining those benefits).
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contribution to the recording. 10 7 The loan-out assigns its copyright interest
to the record label, although it remains the author. Because the recording is
already a "work made for hire" under the "employee" prong of the § 101
definition, however, the recording artist's contribution to the work is now
completely ineligible for termination rights, which do not apply to any
works created as works made for hire. 10 8 Thus, when an artist performs on
a sound recording as a loan-out employee, neither the artist nor his or her
loan-out corporation has any termination rights in that recording.
Under current law, therefore, termination rights are limited to those
recording participants whose contributions are sufficient to qualify them as
joint authors and who render those contributions as individuals rather than
as employees of their own loan-out corporations.
Unless musical
performers discontinue use of these corporations in their recording
contracts, the current battle over termination fights will not affect their
rights at all. 10 9
B. APPLYING WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE STATUS-OR COMPARABLE
RULES-TO SOUND RECORDINGS

The difficulties of applying termination rights to sound recordings that
are joint works, and of measuring the copyright term for such works,
present the strongest policy arguments for making sound recordings
eligible for work-made-for-hire status, as Congress attempted to do in the
short-lived 1999 amendment to § 101. If Congress wishes to accomplish
this result, it can do so in either of two ways: First, it can adopt the
approach of the 1999 amendment and make all sound recordings eligible
for contractual work-made-for-hire status. Alternatively, Congress can
treat sound recordings as a sui generis category, one which is not eligible
for contractual work-made-for-hire status, but which is also (1) either
exempt from termination rights under § 203, or subject to a waivable or
assignable termination right, and (2) subject to the durational provisions
that apply to works made for hire. Either of these approaches would solve

107. Although the loan-out is the sole author of the artist's contribution, it is unlikely to be the
sole author of the complete recording, since it may share authorship with other creative contributors
(such as other musicians, producers, or engineers).
108.
17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
109. Artists who replace their loan-out corporations with limited liability companies ("LLCs")
will avoid this problem, although they may sacrifice some tax benefits. The artist can then function as
an independent contractor rather than an employee, but the LLC structure will still provide limited
liability. See LaFrance, supra note 106, at 923 n.150.

HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 404 2001-2002

2002]

RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS

the two major problems arising from the uncertain status of sound
recordings.
The problem of determining who has the right to terminate a grant of
copyright in a sound recording could be alleviated by amending § 203110 to
provide that termination rights are either waivable or fully alienable in the
case of sound recordings. Alternatively, termination rights could be
altogether eliminated for sound recordings. Although allowing waiver or
alienation of the rights would be less drastic than eliminating them
altogether, in practice, the effect might be largely the same, since most
recording artists will lack sufficient bargaining power to object to
contractual provisions waiving their termination rights or assigning those
rights to the record label. For those few artists with greater bargaining
power, however, the option of alienating those rights would allow the
artists to bind all parties to the recording session to an agreement that
assigns termination rights to a specified individual or group of individuals,
such as the featured musicians, the record producer, or both. This would
eliminate much of the uncertainty that arises when termination rights are
shared by a difficult-to-determine group of joint authors."' Some of the
inequity in bargaining power might also be addressed through a provision
similar to the moral rights waiver provisions of § 106A, 12 under which an
author may waive moral rights only in a written agreement that specifically
identifies the work and the uses to which the waiver applies. Under this
approach, a recording artist might feel pressured to waive termination
rights in that artist's first recording for a record label, but if the waiver
could be enforced only with respect to that specifically identified recording,
110. Amending § 304 to the same effect would not be feasible, since the § 304 termination right
applies to works that were already copyrighted and to grants that were already executed, as of January
1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). Any retroactive narrowing of an author's already-vested rights would
understandably be ill-received-at least by authors.
Ill. In theory, Congress could designate by statute some finite class of creative collaborators in
whom the termination rights in a sound recording would vest. Short of naming the record label as the
sole member of this class, which is tantamount to eliminating the termination right, it is difficult to
imagine a statutory scheme that could conclusively predetermine the owners of termination rights in
every possible type of creative collaboration that results in a sound recording. Even statutory categories
such as "featured" and "nonfeatured" musicians, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(g), 1006(b)(1), are open to much
interpretation. Conceivably, such a statute could limit termination rights to the creative participants
who actually receive credit on the packaging of the sound recording. Although that solution provides
for a determinate number, it may still include a large number of people. In addition, future distribution
mechanisms for sound recordings-in the MP3 format, for example-may involve no packaging, and
thus (possibly) no credits. It is, therefore, doubtful whether any of these theoretical solutions offers
much promise in practice.
112.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(l). The moral rights of authorship (to receive proper attribution for
one's work and to object to certain derogatory alterations of the work) apply only to "works of visual
art" as defined in § 101. Id. § 106A(a).
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then the artist could not be held to a waiver that purported to cover all
future recordings produced under the same recording contract. If the
artist's bargaining power improved after the first recording, the artist might
decide not to waive termination rights in the next recording made pursuant
to that recording contract.
In any situation where the creative participants have waived their
termination rights, or assigned them to the record label, the standard
copyright assignment clause contained in most recording contracts would
therefore effect a permanent, irrevocable, ownership transfer to the record
company. Thus, ownership of the sound recording copyright would belong
to the commissioning party, just as if the recording had been prepared as a
work made for hire. This is the same result that would follow if
termination rights were altogether eliminated for sound recordings.
To further mitigate any imbalance in bargaining power, any
assignment of the termination right should be required to be in writing and
should be held to at least the same degree of specificity as a waiver of that
right. This, too, follows the paradigm of the moral rights waiver. 113 It
would still allow band members to assign termination rights to a single
representative, but would make it impossible for a record label to acquire
the termination rights to all works that an artist might someday produce
under his or her recording contract.
With respect to waivers, the moral rights paradigm might be followed
in one further respect by allowing one joint author to waive the termination
rights of all joint authors.11 4 This would eliminate the need to identify the
entire joint authorship entity as a prerequisite for determining whether the
waiver could be given effect. Even under this approach, however, it would
still be necessary to determine with certainty whether the waiving party
was one of the joint authors of the work.
Furthermore, even if a waiver by one joint author were permitted to
eliminate termination rights in a nonexclusive license, a waiver by a single
joint author probably should not be permitted to eliminate termination
rights in an assignment or exclusive license. Under general joint
authorship principles, an individual joint author may grant a nonexclusive
license in the joint work without the consent of the other joint authors.
Thus, it would be consistent with this principle to allow a single joint
author to waive termination rights in a nonexclusive license; otherwise, if
termination did occur, that same individual could achieve the same result
113.
114.

Id. § 106A(e)(1).
Id.
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by granting a new nonexclusive license to the same grantee. In contrast,
under current law, an attempted assignment or exclusive license by one
joint author is not given effect because a single joint author cannot (in the
absence of an agreement among the joint authors) convey exclusive rights
in a work. 115 At most, the assignee steps into the shoes of the assigning
author and thus acquires an equal and undivided interest in the copyright.
If this principle were applied to the termination right-which is, after all,
one aspect of the "bundle of rights" enjoyed by authors-then a waiver of
termination rights by one joint author should not bind the other joint
authors to surrender their termination rights with respect to an assignment
or exclusive license. Under current law, if termination occurs in the
ordinary course of events, then a new assignment or exclusive license
cannot be executed by just one of the joint authors. Accordingly, in order
to maintain that balance of power, if waivers of termination rights are to be
permitted at all, no individual joint author should have the power to waive
termination rights with respect to an assignment or exclusive license, in the
absence of an agreement among the joint authors. In contrast, the assignee
of a joint author's termination right would simply become one member of
the group of persons entitled to exercise the termination right in that
work.16
Even apart from the termination problem, any statutory scheme that
retains joint work status for sound recordings will still present the problem
of determining the copyright term. Because the copyright term of a joint
work is based on the life of the last surviving author, 117 merely establishing
the duration of the copyright in a jointly authored sound recording can be
problematic, especially since the issue might not even be litigated until
many decades after the recording was created. At this point, the question
whether a particular person's contribution satisfied the joint authorship
requirements 118 would be especially difficult to resolve due to faded
memories, lost evidence, and so on.
115.
1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 21, § 6.11 (May 2000).
116. The group would consist of whatever segment of the joint authorship entity has the statutory
power to terminate that particular grant under §§ 203 and 304(c). See supra notes 74-78. In the case of
a termination under § 304(c), the assignee of termination rights could terminate the grant with respect to
the assignor'sshare of the copyright in the remaining renewal term. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1). In the case
of a termination under § 203, the assignee of termination rights would have the power to terminate a
copyright license or assignment only with the concurrence of a majority of the joint authors (or their
statutory successors, if applicable) who executed the original grant. Id. § 203(a)(1).
117.
17 U.S.C. § 302(b).
118. The legal standard for establishing joint authorship is unclear under current law, and many
courts have required detailed evidence of the co-creators' states of mind and the specific details of their
respective contributions. See sources cited supra note 70.
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To remedy this problem, therefore, if sound recordings are not to be
treated as works made for hire, the durational provisions of § 302 would
need to be amended to establish a fixed copyright term specifically for
sound recordings. A simple solution would be to apply the 95/120 year
term that currently applies to works made for hire under § 302(c).1" 9
C. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SOUND RECORDINGS AMENDMENT

Of course, the extreme version of the proposal set forth aboveeliminating termination rights for sound recordings, and adopting the
95/120 copyright term for those works-is the functional equivalent of
making sound recordings eligible for work-made-for-hire status. 2 ° Thus,
an alternative to the multiple amendments proposed above is to amend the
work-made-for-hire definition to add sound recordings to the list of
"specially commissioned" works which can be the subject of work-madefor-hire contracts. This apparently was the intent of the short-lived 1999
amendment to § 101.
The 1999 amendment was also probably intended to preserve the
existing dichotomy between musical compositions commissioned for
audiovisual works (such as motion pictures) and those commissioned in
fulfillment of a performer/songwriter's sound recording contract. In other
words, musical compositions created for motion pictures would be
contractual works made for hire, while those created for sound recordings
apparently would not. Thus, those who write music for motion pictures
would have no termination rights (as under current law), while those who
write music for sound recordings would enjoy termination rights under
section § 203.
This conclusion, however, is not free from doubt. As discussed
below, it can be argued that the 1999 amendment would have extended
contractual work-made-for-hire status even to musical compositions
created in fulfillment of a singer/songwriter's recording contract. If so, this
would have been a dramatic departure from prior law and surely was not
within Congress' intent.

119. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
120. It is "nearly" the equivalent, because the individual creators of the sound recording would
technically remain "authors." Without any copyright or termination rights, however, their authorship
status would have little legal consequence. Although authors retain certain rights of attribution and
artistic integrity (also known as "moral rights") under § 106A even after transferring their copyrights,
those provisions do not apply to sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (limiting moral rights to "works
of visual art" as defined in § 101).
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By adding the words "as a sound recording" to the work-made-forhire definition, the 1999 amendment provided that any work "specially
ordered or commissioned ... as a sound recording" could be a work made
for hire if the parties' written contract so specified. 21 This language
should be compared with the work-made-for-hire provision regarding
motion pictures, which provides that any work "specially ordered or
commissioned... as a contribution to a motion picture or other audiovisual
work" can qualify as a work made for hire under similar contractual
22
arrangements.'
Why would the phrase "as a contribution to" be included in the motion
picture provision but not in the sound recording provision? To give any
meaning to this phrase, one would have to conclude that a broader array of
contributions is encompassed by the motion picture language than by the
sound recording language. Yet it makes little sense to ascribe work-madefor-hire status only to a completed sound recording, and not to its
component parts, since normally no one individual creates all the
components of the entire recording. Each creative contributor ordinarily
provides only a piece of that recording. There will be vocal tracks,
instrumental tracks, pre-recorded samples, loops, and other computergenerated effects, and various creative decisions and alterations of the total
mix by sound engineers and one or more producers. At least some of these
individual contributions will be substantial enough to meet the
requirements of joint authorship. There is no clear rule defining how
substantial a contribution must be in order to confer joint authorship status
on its creator. Courts generally agree, however, that the contribution must
at least be greater than de minimis, and many courts have held that the
23
contribution must be independently copyrightable.
By tacitly assuming that only the completed sound recording is
copyrightable, the 1999 amendment seems to disregard these copyrightable
contributions. Contrary to this implicit assumption, the only way to turn
the entire sound recording into a work made for hire is to eliminate the
joint authorship claims of each party that contributes a copyrightable
component of the finished recording. In all probability, this is the result
that Congress intended. The same dichotomy exists in the provisions that
grant contractual work-made-for-hire status to a "compilation" as a whole,
121. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113 app. I-S. 1948, §101 l(d), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-544 (amending 17 U.S.C. §101) (repealed
2000). See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
122.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

123.

See generally LaFrance, supra note 40, at 196-98 nn.15-24 (collecting authorities).
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but to each individual "contributionto a collective work."' 124 In that case,
however, the dichotomy make$ sense. In the case of a compilation that is
not also a collective work, the individual components of the work are not
themselves copyrightable, and thus the question of their authorship does
not arise. Only in the case of a collective work-a compilation of
copyrightable materials-could the creator of a single component of the
compilation claim authorship rights in that component. In contrast, when
creative elements are combined to create a sound recording or an
audiovisual work, some of the individual contributions may be
independently copyrightable, thus giving rise to authorship claims by their
creators. Thus, there is no comparable justification for statutory language
treating a "contribution to" an audiovisual work as eligible for work-madefor-hire status while treating a "contribution to" a sound recording as
ineligible for that status.
In contrast, if the language of the 1999 amendment is taken at face
value, it would leave the authorship of all the individual artistic
contributions in the hands of the individual artists and confer contractual
work-made-for-hire status, at most, only on the copyrightable creative
elements that are added in the final mastering of the recording. This would
constitute a de minimis change in the law and would have no effect on the
rights of the recording artists themselves, who could still terminate the
record label's right to use their individual artistic contributions to the
finished recording. Despite the inartful phrasing of the language pertaining
to sound recordings, Congress must have intended to make each
copyrightable contribution to a sound recording eligible for contractual
work-made-for-hire status, thus placing the individual contributors to a
sound recording in the same position as the individual contributors to a
motion picture. (The ambiguity created by this inartful phrasing might well
have been avoided if the 1999 amendment had received more thorough
legislative deliberation instead of being enacted in haste.)
Thus, for the language proposed in the 1999 amendment to have any
meaning at all, it would have to be interpreted to apply to each
copyrightable contributionto a sound recording. This would be consistent
with Congress' apparent intent to give record labels the opportunity to
eliminate the termination rights of performing artists, producers, and sound
engineers. In at least some cases, however, this language would also
eliminate termination rights in one additional and highly significant

124.
text.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added). See also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
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creative contribution to a sound recording, one which Congress almost
certainly did not intend to include in the work-made-for-hire category: the
underlying musical composition(s). To the extent that a particular musical
composition is created specifically for inclusion in a sound recording,
nothing in the 1999 amendment would have prevented treating that musical
composition as a contractual work made for hire. The result would have
been a significant departure from prior law, far beyond anything that
Congress-or even the record industry-could have characterized as a
mere "technical amendment" or clarification of prior law.
In some cases, of course, the musical compositions included in a
sound recording are preexisting works, created by the songwriters at their
own initiative rather than in fulfillment of their obligations under a
recording contract, and only later licensed to a record company for the
purpose of creating a sound recording as a derivative work. In many cases,
and very likely in most cases involving a performer-songwriter who is
fulfilling an obligation to produce a series of recordings under a multirecord contract, however, the artist writes songs specifically for the purpose
of including them in a recording that will be created pursuant to the
preexisting recording contract. In such cases, the musical composition
itself is arguably created as part of the joint undertaking that constitutes the
sound recording. The composition is simply one creative component of the
recording, along with the various vocal and instrumental tracks. In that
event, the effect of the 1999 amendment could have been to place the
musical composition itself into the work-made-for-hire category, along
with all the other creative contributions that were combined into the
The result would have been to deprive such
finished recording.
songwriters of the authorship of their musical compositions, vesting such
authorship instead in the record labels. Thus, public performance and other
royalties that otherwise would have gone to the author and publisher would
go instead to the record company. Termination rights in such musical
compositions would also be nonexistent.
The 1976 House Report addressed an analogous question with respect
to plays, novels, and music incorporated into motion pictures:
The definition of "joint works" has prompted some concern lest it be
construed as converting the authors of previously written works, such as
plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a motion picture in which
their work is incorporated. It is true that a motion picture would
normally be a joint rather than a collective work with respect to those
authors who actually work on the film, although their usual status as
employees for hire would keep the question of co-ownership from
coming up. On the other hand, although a novelist, playwright, or
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songwriter may write a work with the hope or expectation that it will be
used in a motion picture, this is clearly a case of separate or independent
authorship rather than one where the basic intention behind the writing
of the work was for motion picture use. In this case, the motion picture
is a derivative work within the definition of that term, and section 103
makes plain that copyright in a derivative work is independent of, and
does not enlarge the scope of rights in, any preexisting material
incorporated in it. There is thus no need to spell this conclusion out in
125
the definition of "joint work."
In contrast, the Report made clear that, in the case of screenplays and
musical compositions that are works made for hire, authorship vests in the
hiring party. 12 6 Thus, in the case of works created "as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work," musical compositions can be works
made for hire.
It is somewhat less clear whether musical compositions that are
created as a part of a sound recording would fall into the category which
the 1999 amendment described as works "specially ordered or
commissioned.., as a sound recording." The better answer is probably
that Congress did not intend to sweep musical compositions into this
category, even if they are specially commissioned for inclusion in a sound
recording, yet the language of the 1999 amendment does not offer any basis
for treating musical compositions differently from the other creative
elements of a sound recording.
The "as a part of" language used in the 1976 Act was apparently
intended to make clear that commissioned screenplays and soundtrack
music, while capable of standing on their own as separate copyrightable
works, should be treated as having the same authorship as the motion
picture itself when they are created as works made for hire.
By
comparison, the language "as a sound recording" could be interpreted to
assign work-made-for-hire eligibility only to those parts of a sound
recording that are incapable of standing on their own as copyrightable
works. This interpretation would parallel the distinction between (1) a work
specially commissioned "as a contribution to a collective work," where the
individual contribution can also stand on its own as a copyrightable work,
distinct from the collective work itself, and (2) a work specially
commissioned "as a compilation," where the individual elements are not
125. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
126. Id. at 121 (explaining why screenwriters and composers of musical works made for hire may
not invoke the "shop right" doctrine of patent law, under which an inventor retains ownership of an
invention subject to the employer's nonexclusive right to exploit that invention).
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separately copyrightable, so that the only copyrightable work is the
compilation itself.
From this perspective, the underlying musical
composition would not be a work made for hire (unless created by a
common law employee).
It would be the underlying separately
copyrightable work from which the sound recording is derived.
Appealing as this analysis may be as a matter of statutory
interpretation, in fact many components of a sound recording other than the
underlying musical composition are capable of standing on their own as
copyrightable works-for example, the a cappella vocal track, and most, if
not all, of the instrumental tracks. As separate aural experiences they may
be less esthetically satisfying than the total combination that results from
mixing them together, but nothing in the copyright statutes or their
legislative history supports the use of such esthetic judgments as the basis
for distinguishing works made for hire from the independent works that
underlie derivative works.
The challenge, then, is to find a way to classify sound recordings as
contractual works made for hire, thus eliminating the uncertainty
surrounding termination rights and copyright duration in the case of joint
works, without introducing new uncertainty regarding the ownership of the
musical compositions that are specially created for those recordings. The
1999 amendment fell just a little short of this goal.
If the 1999 amendment would indeed have preserved the non-workmade-for-hire status of music commissioned for sound recordings, then
record labels would still have had an incentive to create audiovisual works
rather than sound recordings and to use this strategy to acquire copyright
interests that otherwise would belong to individual songwriters. By
structuring recording contracts so that a performer-songwriter's musical
compositions were initially commissioned for inclusion in an audiovisual
work, rather than a sound recording, the record labels could acquire
ownership of those musical compositions through work-made-for-hire
provisions. Given the relatively weak bargaining power of the typical
singer-songwriter signing his or her first multi-record contract, this practice
would probably become the rule rather than the exception, just as it is
already the rule with respect to the contractual provisions for the recorded
performances themselves. Record labels could then claim authorship of the
musical compositions for all purposes, not simply the avoidance of
termination rights, and the songwriters would retain no portion of the
127
copyrights.
127.

See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
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Two per se rules would be needed under the 1999 amendment in order
to accommodate the songwriter's termination right, the record label's
exploitation right, and the public interest in making copyrightable works
readily marketable. The first per se rule would make all musical
compositions ineligible for contractual work-made-for-hire status,
regardless of the circumstances of their creation.
Thus, musical
compositions would only be works made for hire when created by bona
fide employees of the commissioning party.12 8 The second per se rule
would specify that all recordings of musical compositions are derivative
works within the meaning of the derivative works exception to the
termination right under § 203.129 The two rules combined would guarantee
songwriters a termination right in their musical compositions, regardless of
whether those compositions were specially commissioned for sound
recordings or motion pictures, or created as independent works and
subsequently licensed to creators of derivative works. This approach
would also guarantee the producers of sound recordings and audiovisual
works a right to continue exploiting their recordings of those compositions
(on a nonexclusive basis) as derivative works, even after the songwriter has
terminated the derivative work license for the underlying composition. As
proposed here, this rule would apply not only to musical compositions
created for sound recordings, but also to those created for motion picture
soundtracks and multimedia works (such as videogames). This would alter
the current rule that musical compositions created for motion pictures and
multimedia works can be created as works made for hire under the
"specially ordered or commissioned" clause.
There are two reasons to change current law on musical compositions
specially commissioned for audiovisual works in order to make it conform
with the treatment of musical compositions created for sound recordings.
First, as noted earlier, the distinction between sound recordings and
audiovisual works is rapidly eroding and may soon be untenable. Second,
it is difficult to justify treating a songwriter who creates a composition for a
sound recording differently from a songwriter who creates a composition
for an audiovisual work. Their bargaining positions do not seem
substantially different, and in each case the proposed amendments would
128. For a discussion of "employee" status under copyright law, see supra note 19.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2000). See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Even though
most sound recordings are already derivative works under current law, see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder,
469 U.S. 153, 155 (1985), the second per se rule would foreclose the argument that a record label's
contribution to the sound recording makes it a joint author of the underlying musical compositions that
were created specifically for inclusion in that recording. Cf Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.
1976) (rejecting producer's argument that it was a joint author of film's underlying screenplay).
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protect the commissioning party's right to continue exploiting the
derivative work (that is, the sound recording or audiovisual work) even
after termination, although they would not be permitted to use the
130
composition in new derivative works without obtaining a new license.
In contrast, a simple reenactment of the 1999 amendment without
these per se rules would add sound recordings to the categories eligible for
work-made-for-hire status, but apparently would distinguish between the
status of musical compositions commissioned for sound recordings-which
would not be contractual works made for hire-and the status of musical
compositions commissioned for audiovisual works-which would continue
to be contractual works made for hire as under current law.' 3 ' Although
this alternative would preserve the legal status quo regarding music
commissioned for motion picture soundtracks and other audiovisual works,
it may be time to depart from the status quo. Restoring authorship and
termination rights to soundtrack composers would offer a significant
benefit to this group of authors while preserving the legitimate interests of
future creators of audiovisual works.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of
predictability in copyright ownership 1 32 because uncertainty regarding the
ownership of rights can significantly impair their value and marketability.
By limiting the marketability of a work, this uncertainty also limits the
ability of the public to have access to those works. Thus, uncertainty as to
authorship and ownership contravenes the public policy of making
copyrightable works available to the public.
The importance of predictability is reflected in the copyright statutes
themselves. The provisions dealing with authorship and ownership of
copyrights are designed to give authors adequate notice of when they are
surrendering valuable rights. Examples of this policy include the writing
requirement for copyright transfers,' 33 the writing requirement for

130.

17 U.S.C. § 203 (b)(1).

131. This distinction could be further clarified by specifying that, for purposes of the work-madefor-hire rules, the statutory term "sound recordings" does not include the musical compositions
performed on those recordings.
132.

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

133.

17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
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contractual works-made-for-hire, 134 and the high degree of specificity that
135
is required for moral rights waivers.
A strong argument can be made that the work-made-for-hire definition
of § 101 is drafted in terms broad enough to encompass many commercial
sound recordings as contributions to collective works. Treating sound
recordings as works made for hire arguably serves the purpose of providing
greater certainty as to the ownership of copyrights, since it eliminates the
uncertainties that accompany joint authorship. The legislative histories of
the 1976 Act and the 1971 Sound Recordings Act, however, do not support
the conclusion that Congress intended to treat sound recordings as
contractual works made for hire. Interpreting "collective works" to include
sound recordings thus runs afoul of the certainty principle, since including
sound recordings in that definition extends work-made-for-hire status to a
large category of works that one reasonably would have expected Congress
to have mentioned specifically either in the work-made-for-hire definition
or its legislative history--especially in light of the specific references to
motion pictures and other distinct categories of copyrightable works in the
1976 Act, the accompanying House Report, and other components of its
36
legislative history.1
What do performing artists lose if they are denied termination rights?
Although most sound recordings will have little economic value thirty-five
years after their creation, some (such as the Beatles' recordings) will have
substantial long-term economic value, and others may have significant
noneconomic value to the artists or their families. In the latter case, even
though the cost of reacquiring the copyright in a sound recording might be
modest, subsequent assignments and corporate successions could make it
difficult for recording artists or their families to locate the owner of the
sound recording copyright so many years after the recording's release.
Termination rights would eliminate this problem.
Even if termination rights in sound recordings are recognized,
however, and even if termination can be effectuated through accurate
identification of the authorship entities in the case of joint works, an artist
who wishes to terminate those rights will not necessarily be allowed to
reclaim rights in an entire marketable work. To the extent that record label
employees made creative contributions, their contributions would still be
owned by the record label, even after termination, with respect to the other

134.
135.
136.

Id. § 101.
Id. § 106A(e)(1).
See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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parties' contributions. And, as noted earlier, performers who rendered their
services through loan-out corporations would not be eligible to invoke
termination rights at all.' 3 7
Thus, the benefits of recognizing termination rights in sound
recordings may not be as significant as their advocates have suggested, and
in most cases would not outweigh the practical problems created by
granting such rights because of the difficulty of identifying the "authors"
who are entitled to exercise those rights, and then separating the terminable
contributions from the nonterminable ones (those attributable to
employees). Finally, as noted earlier, record labels have a potential "end
run" around termination rights if they choose to create musical recordings
as audiovisual works rather than sound recordings and can use this same
strategy to divest performer-songwriters of their authorship rights in
musical compositions as well.
To maximize predictability and marketability in copyrighted sound
recordings, it would be helpful to eliminate the complexities of joint
authorship as they affect copyright duration and termination rights. The
duration question is easily solved by assigning sound recordings a fixed
term, such as the term of 95/120 years that applies to works made for hire.
It would be far more difficult, however, to preserve the essence of
termination rights in sound recordings while eliminating the complications
of joint authorship in such works. In addition, the benefit of preserving
those termination rights is dubious, because most sound recordings will
have little economic value after thirty-five years, and because the nonterminable contributions of record label employees and loan-out employees
may make it difficult for contributors other than songwriters to reassemble
a marketable post-termination copyright.
Congressional inaction is not an appropriate solution to the problem of
determining whether sound recordings are works made for hire. Through
self-help, record companies can take advantage of new technologies to
ensure that all of their future recordings are works made for hire, and
thereby divest composers of their authorship rights, and possibly obtain
public performance rights in musical recordings as well.
Rather than permit the recording industry to achieve numerous endruns around copyright law and policy, Congress should act promptly to
resolve these issues through legislation. It may well serve the best interest
of the public, and impose little detriment on recording artists, to eliminate

137.
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termination rights in sound recordings, either through sui generis
legislation or through amending the work-made-for-hire definition to
include "specially ordered or commissioned" sound recordings. Congress,
however, also has the opportunity to protect against any further erosion of
the termination rights of songwriters whose works are utilized in sound
recordings, and to restore the termination rights of songwriters whose
works are utilized in audiovisual works. Because, unlike the termination
rights of recording artists, the termination rights of songwriters are likely
to have significant value and are unlikely to be encumbered by complex
joint authorship questions, protecting and, indeed, broadening those rights
will not impair the marketability of those musical compositions, nor will it
impair the marketability of any derivative works (such as motion pictures)
that incorporate those compositions because those works are already
protected under the derivative works exception.
Accordingly, any
legislative proposals regarding the authorship of sound recordings must be
accompanied by careful consideration of the rights of songwriters.
It has been thirty-five years since Professor Benjamin Kaplan, in his
landmark essay, An Unhurried View of Copyright, criticized the 1966
copyright revision bill for failing to address the ownership of sound
recording copyrights: "[T]he revision bill takes the ostrich tack of omitting
to say who is to be the presumptive owner of the copyright-performer,
138
manufacturer, or both."'
Thirty-five years is a long time, even for an ostrich.
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